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Abstract
Why do individuals borrow and save money at the same time? I present a model in
which sophisticated time-inconsistent agents, when faced with a future investment opportu-
nity, rationally choose to save their wealth and then borrow to fund the investment. The
combination of savings and a loan generates incentives for future selves to invest optimally
by punishing over-consumption. This paper contains two main results. First, I show that
agents who simultaneously save and borrow can have higher lifetime welfare than those who
don’t. Second, I show that agents who have access to a non-secure savings technology can
be better oﬀ than those who only have access to secure savings.
∗Contact: karna@uchicago.edu. For comments and suggestions, I thank Abhijit Banerjee, Gary Becker, Xavier
Gabaix, John List, Jonathan Morduch, Sendhil Mullainathan, and participants of the Microeconomics Workshop
at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. I have also benefited from discussions with Dean
Karlan, who initially proposed the problem tackled in this paper.
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1 Introduction
Why would an individual simultaneously save and borrow when the interest rate on saving is
no higher than on borrowing? There are a number of economic explanations for such behavior .
Traditional theories usually rely on the option value of savings — under risky conditions, an agent
might maintain savings for use in case of an emergency (if, for example, there are transaction
costs of taking a loan on short notice, or if bankruptcy laws don’t require the agent to repay
a loan even if there are assets in the bank). Behavioral explanations, most notably Laibson,
Repetto and Tobacman (2001), focus on illiquid savings as a self-control device. Agents lock
assets for future consumption while smoothing short-term consumption with high-interest credit
card debt.
This paper is motivated by the environment and experience of microfinance institutions
(MFIs). Morduch and Armendariz (2005) describe how one of the principle innovations of
modern microfinance has been the introduction of savings technologies. Clients of microfinance
are commonly encouraged to maintain savings accounts with the MFI, which can serve as a
source of secondary loans for other clients. There is evidence that some borrowers save more
than is required by the MFI (or necessary to secure access to future loans). Examples of this
phenomenon can be found in Peru (Karlan, 2007), Bangladesh (Dehejia, Montgomery, and
Morduch, 2005), and Cameroon (Baland, Guirkinger, and Mali, 2007). In Baland, Guirkinger,
and Mali’s (2007) data from Cameroon, savings exceed loan size for 20% of the loans. They
present a model in which individuals save and borrow to disguise their wealth in the face of
social pressures to donate.
In this paper, I propose an alternative explanation for simultaneous saving and borrowing.
While this model is not intended to capture every motivation behind an individual’s decision
to save with and borrow from an MFI, it highlights an unexplored mechanism that can help us
understand some of this behavior. As in Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2001), agents have
time-inconsistent preferences, but savings serve a diﬀerent purpose. I exploit the possibility
that savings accounts are not entirely secure. This is a reasonable assumption in settings where
clients’ savings are distributed as secondary loans.1 I show that individuals might value the
uncertainty associated with savings, as this allows them to generate threats that improve the
behavior of future selves. When faced with a future investment opportunity, an agent can create
1This is indeed the case with FINCA in Peru (Karlan, 2007).
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incentives to invest by simultaneously saving and borrowing. The risk associated with saving
can no longer be interpreted as an eﬀective reduction in the interest rate; rather, it serves to
magnify the penalties associated with failing to invest. This also suggests that the presence of
a few unreliable borrowers can prove beneficial to others.
The implications of this model are not limited to microfinance, and I hope to make some
points about commitment devices in general. A commitment device is a technology that allows
an individual to restrict her future choice set or alter rewards and punishments associated with
future decisions. This could, for example, take the form of a contract that stipulates future
investment or a deadline for the completion of a costly task. Such technologies might be valued
by a time-inconsistent agent because they encourage her future selves to make those decisions
that maximize her long-run welfare.2 An interesting implication of the model is that, even when
explicit commitment is unavailable, its eﬀects can be replicated if individuals have access to a
non-secure savings instrument. In this context, what appears to be an irrational destruction of
wealth is in fact the price of the commitment device.
This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 provides an intuitive description of the model
in the context of related literature. Section 3 covers the main results. Section 4 contains a
discussion of comparative statics generated by the model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Description of the Model
In this section, I describe some of the intuition of the model. The goal of the model is to
explain an individual’s decision to make a savings and borrowing decision at the same time and
in the same bank. I consider a banking structure that is broadly consistent with microfinance.
Individuals can borrow money, which must be repaid by the end of a cycle. During this cycle,
they can also save with the bank (at the same interest rate as borrowing). Savings remain
illiquid until the end of the cycle, but can be used to repay the loan at the end. However, there
is a small risk that agents who save with the bank will fail to get their deposits back.3
The possibility that savings are maintained for their option value is unlikely for two reasons.
First, since the lender organization is the same as the borrower, it is not possible for an agent to
2"Welfare" is not a well-defined concept when agents have time-inconsistent preferences. I follow O’Donoghue
and Rabin (1999), who evaluate welfare as the utility the agent would enjoy if she were a time-consistent agent.
3To be more precise, the agent perceives a risk that her savings will not mature. Alternatively, we could
assume that there is a risk of delay in repayment (instead of complete default).
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default on a loan while still having access to her savings in the case of a negative shock. Second,
savings are illiquid during a loan cycle. Then, if an agent has a sudden need for liquidity, it is
not clear that it is easier for her to access her savings than it is to simply take out a fresh loan
from the bank. Since alternative banking services are very limited, it is unlikely that a savings
account with an MFI would be useful as collateral for other banks.
I also suggest that, unlike in Laibson, Repetto and Tobacman (2001), agents are not using
savings for their illiquidity. In their model, agents save to ensure adequate consumption in the
distant future, and take out high-interest loans if they suﬀer negative income shocks. However,
in our context, while savings are not liquid within a loan cycle, they can nevertheless be used
to pay back loans at the end of a cycle. Also, agents make the decision to maintain debt and
savings simultaneously, so the loans are not a response to an unanticipated shock.
In the following model, the agent is a quasi-hyperbolic discounter who has the opportunity
to make an investment in the middle of her life.4 While her early selves would like her to invest,
she is unwilling to make the sacrifice when the opportunity presents itself. If this was simply
a problem of over-consumption due to time-inconsistent preferences, the young agent would try
to lock some of her wealth in an illiquid account (which would mature later in life). However, in
this case, such an action can have adverse eﬀects: first, this reduces future incentives to invest;
and second, it reduces future ability to invest (if investment requires a large amount of liquid
cash). The young agent’s goal is to leave enough liquid assets for future investment while also
creating an incentive to invest. I find that, in some cases, this can be done optimally by saving
in the bank while also borrowing from it. Borrowing ensures that the agent has enough money
to invest in the future. Saving creates the incentive to do so.
Saving, apart from the potential interest earned, is also a source of uncertainty. If the agent
saves her assets in the bank while leaving borrowed money for her future self, that self must
decide whether to (a) indulge her present-biased preferences and consume, or (b) consume less
and invest. If the money was not borrowed (or if savings were entirely secure), she might choose
to indulge. Now, however, indulgence becomes more costly. Since it is possible that her savings
will not mature in the future, she risks defaulting on her own loans if she over-consumes today.
On the other hand, if she invests, she is insuring herself against the small possibility that her
savings will not mature in the future. If the punishment for default is suﬃciently high, she will
4 In particular, I focus on forms of investment that can plausibly be construed as safe, such as inventory or
working capital.
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choose to invest.
The young agent is eﬀectively paying (by simultaneously saving and borrowing) for a com-
mitment device. This commitment device generates costly punishments for "bad" behavior,
thus ensuring that her future selves invest optimally. As long as savings are suﬃciently (but not
fully) secure, the cost of this commitment device is low enough to justify its use.
3 Model
3.1 Assumptions
There is one individual who lives for 3 periods. As shown in the timeline below, there is no
consumption in period 0 but banking decisions must be made at this time. In period 1, the
agent can consume but also has the opportunity to invest. In period 2, savings mature, loans
are repaid, and the agent consumes her remaining assets.
t
210
Banking decision Investment decision
Saving decision
Consumption decision
Consumption
Loan repayment
Figure 1: Timeline
The agent has an endowment w in period 0. The price of investment is p < w, and the
monetary benefit of investment is b > p. Let g = b−p denote the net benefit of investment. The
agent has a strictly concave per-period utility function u (·). She is a quasi-hyperbolic discounter
with δ = 1 (the exponential discount factor) and 0 < β ≤ 1 (the hyperbolic discount factor).
Following convention, I treat the individual as three independent time-indexed agents: agent 0,
agent 1, and agent 2. Then, agent 0’s discounted utility is V = u (c1) + u (c2) while agent 1’s
discounted utility is U = u (c1)+βu (c2). This automatically implies that the optimal plan from
agent 1’s perspective deviates from agent 0’s optimal plan.
If banking services are used, savings takes place at an exogenous interest rate r (R ≡ 1+ r),
such that x in period 0 yields Rx in period 2. If an agent saves with the bank, the savings
disappear with some probability ε > 0. This can be interpreted as a natural outcome of intra-
group saving — if information is imperfect and there are some unreliable borrowers in a group,
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there is a possibility that my savings will never mature. She also has the option of saving at
home (these savings are fully secure, fully liquid, and earn no interest).
The agent can borrow from the bank at the same interest rate, r. The largest allowed loan
is denoted lmax.5 If she does not repay her loan in full, her assets (amounts saved privately and
in the bank) are seized and she faces an additional utility loss of F . This can be interpreted
as social sanctions or the cost of restricted access to future banking services. I assume that F
is large enough that it is always worth reducing consumption to avoid a risk of future default.6
Formally, for a given ε: u (Rlmax)− u (0) < βεF .7
I use the following notation in the paper: c is the amount consumed in period 1, s is the
amount saved with the bank in period 0, and l is the amount borrowed from the bank in period
0. Any amount neither saved in the bank nor consumed is automatically sent to the next period.
Finally, I apply the following tie-breaking rule: when the agent is indiﬀerent between investing
and not investing, she always chooses to invest.
In the following sections, I use backward induction to solve for the Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibrium under diﬀerent settings. In each period, the agent observes state variables (assets
in each account), and makes an investment/consumption/savings decision based on the options
available to her.
3.2 No Investment Opportunity
It is useful to first study the agent’s behavior in the absence of the investment opportunity. If
she does not have access to the bank, there is no action available to agent 0. Therefore, agent
1 will simply choose her consumption level to equalize discounted marginal utilities.
max
0≤c≤w
u (c) + βu (w − c)
Agent 1 will choose c to satisfy u0 (c) = βu0 (w − c) (or the corner solution, c = w).
5Let lmax > 2w + g. This ensures that the maximum loan size will not pose a constraint in the analysis that
follows.
6F does not have to constitute an explicit punishment. Basu (2008) shows that the threat of being banned
from access to future loans can be suﬃcient to ensure that an agent always repays.
7 I also conjecture that, with appropriate assumptions on the concavity of the utility function, the results of
this paper can be derived in the absence of any punishment for default.
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3.2.1 Loan
Now suppose banking is available. Agent 0 would like to improve period 2 consumption. She
would therefore borrow money only if it encouraged agent 1 to raise agent 2’s consumption.
However, since a loan eﬀectively destroys wealth, agent 1 will not save more than in the no-
banking case. Any outcome achieved by a combination of borrowing and saving can be achieved
(or improved on) by simply saving less and borrowing 0.
Proposition 1 When there is no investment to be made, the agent will never borrow in period
0.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
3.2.2 Saving
How much should the agent save in period 0? Given that saving is risky, she might choose to
save only a fraction of wealth in the bank, allowing the rest to pass through agent 1.8 For this
section, agent 0’s discounted utility and agent 1’s discounted utility are respectively described
as the following:
• V (s, c) = u (c) + (1− ε)u (w − c+ rs) + (ε)u (w − c− s)
• U (s, c) = u (c) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c+ rs) + εu (w − c− s)]
Exponential Discounter As a benchmark, I solve for the optimal savings level for an expo-
nential discounter.
Agent 1 takes s as given and solves:
max
0≤c≤w−s
V (s, c)
If there is an interior solution, it is given by the first-order condition:
u0 (c) = (1− ε)u0 (w − c+ rs) + (ε)u0 (w − c− s) (1)
Let c¯exp (s) denote the consumption level that satisfies agent 1’s maximization problem..
8 If u000 (·) > 0, a precautionary saving motive will discourage her from saving all her wealth in the bank. If
not, risk aversion can directly limit the amount to be saved in the bank, even if the interest rate is attractive.
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Agent 0’s problem is the following:
max
0≤s≤w
V (s, c (s))
Again, for an interior solution, the first-order condition is:
u0 (c) c¯0exp (s) + (1− ε)u0 (w − c+ rs)
¡
r − c¯0exp (s)
¢
+ (ε)u0 (w − c− s)
¡
−1− c¯0exp (s)
¢
Applying the envelope theorem, this can be simplified to:
(1− ε) ru0 (w − c+ rs)− (ε)u0 (w − c− s) = 0 (2)
Conditions 1 and 2, along with the corner restrictions, provide a solution to the optimal
saving problem. Let the utility-maximizing saving level be denoted s¯exp. Observe that, if
(1− ε) r ≤ ε, then s¯exp = 0 and if (1− ε) r > ε, then s¯exp > 0.9
Let the maximized utilities be U¯ exps = U (s¯exp, c¯exp (s¯exp)) and V¯
exp
s = V (s¯exp, c¯exp (s¯exp)).
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounter Now, agent 1 solves:
max
0≤s≤w
U (s, c)
The first-order condition for an interior solutions (if it exists) is:
u0 (c) = β (1− ε)u0 (w − c+ rs) + β (ε)u0 (w − c− s) (3)
Let c¯ (s) denote the solution to agent 1’s maximization problem.
Agent 0’s problem is the following:
max
0≤s≤w
V (s, c (s))
Again, for an interior solution, the first-order condition is:
u0 (c) c¯0 (s) + (1− ε)u0 (w − c+ rs)
¡
r − c¯0 (s)
¢
+ (ε)u0 (w − c− s)
¡
−1− c¯0 (s)
¢
9Starting at s = 0, agent 0 would increase saving only if this raised agent 2’s utility. If (1− ε) r ≤ ε, then the
marginal eﬀect on agent 2’s utility from a rise in s cannot be positive.
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By substituting from Condition 3, this can be simplified to:
(1− ε) ru0 (w − c+ rs)− (ε)u0 (w − c− s) = c¯0 (s)u0 (c) (1− β)
β
(4)
Conditions 3 and 4, along with the corner restrictions, provide a solution to the optimal
saving problem. Let the utility-maximizing saving level be denoted s¯. As for the exponential
discounter, s¯ > 0 if (1− ε) r > ε. However, in this case, agent 0 might choose to save even
if (1− ε) r ≤ ε. This is because the negative eﬀect of "burning" money (by saving) might be
outweighed by reduced consumption by agent 1. Since agent 1 initially consumes too much from
agent 0’s perspective, this could bring marginal utilities across periods closer to each other. Let
the maximized utilities be U¯s = U (s¯, c¯ (s¯)) and V¯s = V (s¯, c¯ (s¯)).
For the purposes of this exercise, it is convenient to restrict the interest rate so that the
agent has no incentive to save if she knows the investment will be made: R < u
0(w−p−s)
u0(b+Rs) . This
eliminates any direct savings motive from the problem.
3.3 The Role of Investment
Suppose agent 0 wants the investment to be made in period 1. Then, for agent 1 to respond
appropriately, she should have the necessary liquid cash, and suﬃcient incentives to invest. First,
consider the case where agent 0 does not engage in banking. The only decision that remains
to be made is a saving amount in period 1. If this amount exceeds p, then the investment is
made. Figures 2 and 3 depict period 1 utility and period 2 utility, each as a function of period 1
consumption, c. In Figure 3, the jump occurs at the minimum savings required for investment.
The optimal outcome from agent 0’s perspective will fall into one of the following three
categories:
(a) u0 (c) = u0 (w − c) (if c > w − p)
(b) c = w − p
(c) u0 (c) = u0 (w − c+ g) (if c < w − p)
The first outcome involves no investment, the second is a corner solution involving investment
(invest, but consume as much as possible in period 1), and in the third case agent 1 not only
invests but also transfers some additional cash to agent 2. If there is indeed a value of c that
8
cwp
u1
Figure 2: Period 1 utility as a function of period 1 consumption, assuming period 0 did not use
banking.
cwp
u2
Figure 3: Period 2 utility as function of period 1 saving, assuming period 0 did not use banking.
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satisfies condition (c), that must be the solution. If instead, condition (a) is satisfied, then agent
0 will compare the outcomes from condition (a) and condition (b), and choose the one that
provides higher discounted utility.
Now consider the same problem from agent 1’s perspective. Her analysis will be similar to
the one above, except that the RHS of conditions (a) and (c) will be multiplied by β. In other
words, she will have a tendency to consume more than is optimal (from the period 0 perspective).
It is easy to identify the set of possible decisions in period 1 based on the optimal outcome. If
the optimal category is (a), agent 1’s choice must also lie in (a). If the optimal is (b), then agent
1’s choice can lie in (a) or (b). Finally, if the optimal is (c), agent 1’s decision can fall into any
category (which will be determined by the magnitude of β).
3.3.1 Outcomes of Interest
In the following table, I divide possible outcomes into 9 categories based on the following: (1)
the optimal outcome without banking (Opt); (2) agent 0’s optimal banking solution, assuming
agent 1 plays like an exponential discounter (Opt Bank); (3) agent 1’s decision in the absence
of banking; (4) agent 1’s reaction to agent 0’s optimal banking solution.
# Opt Opt Bank Hyp Hyperbolic’s Reaction to Optimal Banking
1 (c) No banking (c) Invest as before (but consume more than ideal)
2 (b) Invest as before (but consume more than ideal)
3 (a) Don’t invest (much worse than ideal)
4 (b) Take a loan (b) Invest as before, and consume the loan (ideal)
5 (a) Invest, and consume the loan (ideal)
6 Don’t invest, but consume less (much worse than ideal)
7 (a) Take a loan (a) Invest, and consume the loan (ideal)
8 Don’t invest, but consume less (much worse than ideal)
9 Save some (a) Don’t invest (but consume more than ideal)
In regions 4, 5, 7, the time-inconsistency poses no problem since agent 1 behaves exactly as
agent 0 would like her to. In regions 1, 2, and 9, agent 1 does not behave in an ideal manner,
but there is no disagreement on the major decision of investment. I will focus on regions 3, 6
and 8. In regions 6 and 8, in particular, agent 0 faces the following problem: the ideal outcome
is one in which a loan is taken and the investment made. However, at the optimal level of loan,
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c
ww+l-p
u2
w+l
w-p
w-Rl
Figure 4: Period 2 utility if period 0 takes a loan. If agent 1 consumes more than w −Rl∗, she
will default. Also, note that agent 1 can now make the investment at a higher level of c
the quasi-hyperbolic agent will not actually invest. Even though there is enough liquid cash for
the investment, agent 1 does not have enough incentives to forgo current consumption for the
investment.
Suppose agent 0’s optimal outcome involves investment with a loan (investing is suﬃciently
expensive that it is worth compensating agent 1 with a loan. The optimal loan, l∗, will satisfy:
u0 (w − p+ l∗) = u0 (b−Rl∗) (5)
However, given that agent 1 is free to make her investment decision, if she is suﬃciently time-
inconsistent she might nevertheless not invest.
Consider the decision in period 1. The agent has wealth w + l∗ and must consume some
amount c to maximize her discounted utility. Observe that she will reduce her consumption in
response to the loan. Since a loan is eﬀectively a cost imposed on agent 2, agent 1 will, at the
very least, transfer some additional money to agent 2 to equalize discounted marginal utilities.
This increases the relative attractiveness of the investment. However, if β is suﬃciently low, she
will still choose c > w + l∗ − p (This is formally described in the sections below). This is the
type of agent we are going to study.
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Figure 4 shows how agent 2’s utility function changes (from the broken line to the unbroken
line) as a result of a loan. Since a loan needs to be repaid, note that the new utility function
has a steeper slope (relative to the old function) everywhere.
3.4 Inducing Investment
As l rises, agent 1’s marginal benefit of saving increases (relative to the marginal cost of saving)
with loan size. However, as we have seen, a loan of l∗ might not be suﬃcient to induce investment.
Then, the agent in period 0 has access to three types of actions:
1. Give up on investing and save some amount s in the bank. The maximized utilities from
saving are U¯s and V¯s.
2. Increase l so that the agent in period 1 has an incentive to invest.
3. Simultaneously save and borrow. This creates a threat for the period 1 agent — if she does
not invest, there is a possibility that she will be unable to pay her loan in period 2. If F
is large, this threat can create incentives to invest.
3.4.1 Pure Loan
Consider agent 1’s decision as the loan size increases. She will focus on two eﬀects. First,
investment requires a lower sacrifice of current consumption (since the loan transfers consump-
tion from period 2 to period 1). Second, the marginal utility loss for agent 2 (as a function of
c) becomes higher, thus creating incentives to consume less. These eﬀects together lead to a
reduction in c, possibly up to a point where the investment becomes worthwhile.
The proposition in the next section establishes the following: if some l is large enough for
the investment to be made, it will continue to be made at all larger values of l. Also, given
the assumption on F , it is clear that agent 1 will choose to invest at l ≥ wr (if not, agent 2
would default regardless of agent 1’s consumption level). Therefore, agent 0 can always induce
investment with a suﬃciently large loan. Let the smallest such loan be denoted l¯, which will
satisfy l∗ < l¯ ≤ wr . Agent 0’s discounted utility from this loan is:
V¯l = u
¡
w − p+ l¯
¢
+ u
¡
b−Rl¯
¢
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Agent 1’s discounted utility is:
U¯l = u
¡
w − p+ l¯
¢
+ βu
¡
b−Rl¯
¢
3.4.2 Simultaneous Saving and Borrowing
In this section, I show how a combination of loans and savings can be used to induce investment.
The following two propositions show that, for any target consumption c (and corresponding loan
level, l), there is a function that pins down the level of "simultaneous saving and borrowing"
needed to ensure investment. I also establish some convenient properties of this function. Section
3.5 provides a graphical intuition of the results below.
Let x be the amount of simultaneous borrowing and saving and l be the level of pure bor-
rowing (so that the total loan is l+x and the total saved in the bank is x). Assume l+x ≤ w+gr
(this ensures that loan repayment is feasible). Let cˆ (l, x) be agent 1’s optimal consumption level.
The following two points are established in Proposition 2: As long as no investment is made,
agent 1’s consumption is decreasing in loan size and level of simultaneous saving and borrowing.
If agent 1 decides to invest, she will continue to invest for larger levels of l or x.
Proposition 2 Assume l + x ≤ w+gr . (a) When cˆ > w + l − p, cˆ (l, x) decreases strictly in x,
and when cˆ ≤ w+ l− p, cˆ (l, x) decreases weakly in x. (b) When cˆ > w+ l− p, cˆ (l, x) decreases
strictly in l, and when cˆ ≤ w + l − p, an increase in l can never lead to c > w + l − p.
Proof. At any level of l and x, agent 1’s optimal choice of c can fall into one of the following
categories: (i) c = w − rl −Rx and satisfies (corner, no investment)
u0 (c) > β
£
(1− ε)u0 (w − c− rl) + (ε)u0 (w − c− rl −Rx)
¤
(ii) c ∈ (w + l − p,w − rl −Rx) and satisfies (interior, no investment)
u0 (c) = β
£
(1− ε)u0 (w − c− rl) + (ε)u0 (w − c− rl −Rx)
¤
(iii) c = w + l − p and (corner, investment)
u0 (c) > β
£
(1− ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl) + (ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl −Rx)
¤
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(iv) c ∈ [0, w + l − p) and satisfies (interior, investment)
u0 (c) = β
£
(1− ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl) + (ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl −Rx)
¤
(a) Consider the change in c in response to an increase in x in each of the categories.
(i) An increase in x must lead to a decrease in c (this is necessitated by the shift in the
corner).
(ii) An increase in x raises the RHS of the equality condition. c must decrease to re-
establish equality (or move to category (iii)).
(iii) An increase in x raises the RHS of the inequality. If the agent continues to invest, c
must remain the same or decrease. Also, agent 1 will certainly not choose to forgo
investment. Suppose she does. Then,
u (c) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c+ b− rl) + (ε)u (w − c+ b− rl −Rx)]
< u (c˜) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c˜− rl) + (ε)u (w − c˜− rl −Rx)]
where c = w+ l−p and c˜ satisfies the condition described in category (i) or (ii). Now
consider a marginal reduction in x. The LHS rises by less than the RHS. Then, it
was not optimal to be in category (iii) in the first place. Contradiction.
(iv) Using the reasoning in category (iii), an increase in x leads to an decrease in c.
(b) Consider the change in c in response to an increase in l in each of these categories.
(i) An increase in l must lead to a decrease in c because of the shift in the corner.
(ii) An increase in l raises the RHS of the equality condition. c must decrease to re-
establish equality (or move to category (iii)).
(iii) First, note that an increase in l cannot lead agent 1 to forgo investment. Suppose
she now forgoes investment and consumes some c˜ > w + l − p. Then,
u (c˜) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c− rl) + (ε)u (w − c− rl −Rx)]
> u (c) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c+ b− rl) + (ε)u (w − c+ b− rl −Rx)]
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where c = w + l − p > c˜. A marginal decrease in l leads to a larger rise in
the LHS of this inequality. So it would not have been optimal for the agent to
be in category (iii) in the first place. Contradiction. Now, as long as u0 (c) >
β [(1− ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl) + (ε)u0 (w − c+ b− rl −Rx)], an increase in l will lead
to an increase in c. After equality is achieved, c will move inversely with l and the
agent will be in category (iv).
(iv) Using the reasoning above, we know that c will move inversely with l (as far as it is
feasible).
Proposition 3 shows that the level of simultaneous saving and borrowing required to induce
investment is decreasing in loan size. Since a larger loan size makes investment less painful
for agent 1, this reduces agent 0’s need to provide additional inducement through simultaneous
saving and borrowing.
Proposition 3 Let xˆ (l) be the minimum level of x required to ensure investment. Assume
l ≤ wr . Then, (a) xˆ (l) ≤
w+rl
r and (b) xˆ (l) is weakly decreasing in l.
Proof. (a) By the assumption on F , agent 1 will not risk default. Therefore, if x + l ≥ wr , or
x ≥ w−rlr , she will certainly invest.
(b) Consider some l and the corresponding x (l). By the definition of x (l),
u (w − p+ l) + β [(1− ε)u (b−Rl) + (ε)u (b−Rl −Rx)] (6)
≥ u (c) + β [(1− ε)u (w − c− rl) + (ε)u (w − c− rl −Rx)]
for any c < w − p+ l. Now, consider l˜ > l. Suppose there is some c˜ < w − p+ l˜ such that
u
³
w − p+ l˜
´
+ β
h
(1− ε)u
³
b−Rl˜
´
+ (ε)u
³
b−Rl˜ −Rx
´i
< u (c˜) + β
h
(1− ε)u
³
w − c˜− rl˜
´
+ (ε)u
³
w − c˜− rl˜ −Rx
´i
Let l˜ − l = k. Then, by the concavity of u,
u
³
w − p+ l˜ − k
´
+ β
h
(1− ε)u
³
b−Rl˜ +Rk
´
+ (ε)u
³
b−Rl˜ −Rx+Rk
´i
< u (c˜− k) + β
h
(1− ε)u
³
w − c˜− rl˜ +Rk
´
+ (ε)u
³
w − c˜− rl˜ −Rx+Rk
´i
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This contradicts Condition 6. Therefore, x
³
l˜
´
≤ x (l).
Note that l¯ is the lowest loan level for which xˆ (l) = 0.
3.5 Simultaneous Saving & Borrowing: Existence
The following thought experiment illustrates the role of simultaneous saving and borrowing.
Suppose, starting at s = 0 and l = l∗ (the optimal level), agent 0 was to increase loan and
bank saving simultaneously and by identical amounts. The period 1 utility (as a function of c)
will remain unchanged. However, period 2 utility as a function of c will drop. In Figure 5, the
broken line represents the base case (s = 0 and l = l∗). The solid line, depicting period 2 utility
after some simultaneous borrowing an saving, is broken into four segments. The lowest segment
is the region in which the agent in period 2 will certainly default. The second-lowest segment
is the region in which agent 2 might default (if the savings do not mature). The second-highest
segment is the case where there is no chance of default, and the investment is not made. The
uppermost segment describes the case where the investment is made in period 1.
c
ww+l-p
u2
w+l
w-Rl-Rx
w-Rl
Figure 5: Period 2 utility as agent 0 raises loan and savings simultaneously
Suppose, at s = 0 and l = l∗, agent 1 chooses some amount c that satisfies w + l − p < c <
w−Rl−Rx. In this case, she is avoiding default but not making the investment. Suppose agent
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0 saves more and borrows more. Now, the region in which default is possible expands. If agent
1 continues to save her original amount, she might face punishment in period 2. To prevent
this, she must raise the amount she saves. Here, it can become optimal for the agent to invest.
Note that if ε is low, the final outcome is close to the optimal outcome (from the perspective of
period 0).
In this case, saving creates the incentive to invest, while borrowing is used to actually fund
the investment.
Proposition 4 There is a parameter region over (r, β, F, ε) in which the agent will save s > 0
and borrow l > 0 in period 0.
Proof. If r is suﬃciently low, the optimal outcome involves a loan, l∗ > 0. Let agent 0’s optimal
discounted utility be denoted V ∗:
V ∗ = u (w − p+ l∗) + u (b−Rl∗)
Recall that the optimal no-investment outcome is denoted V¯s. For any r, an upper bound
on V¯s exists and can be found by setting ε = 0. Therefore, if r is suﬃciently low (regardless
of ε), the optimal investment outcome is strictly preferred to the best achievable no-investment
outcome.
V ∗ > V¯s
Given r, if β is suﬃciently low, the optimal investment outcome is strictly preferred to the
best achievable investment outcome.
V ∗ > V¯l
Let D be the diﬀerence between the optimal outcome and the best possible outcome from a
pure loan or pure saving:
D = V ∗ −max
©
V¯l, V¯s
ª
> 0
Since there is an upper bound on V¯s that does not depend on ε, there must be a lower bound
on D that does not depend on ε. Let this value be denoted Dmin. If r is suﬃciently low, and if
given r, β is suﬃciently low, Dmin > 0.
For any target l, let the period 0 discounted utility from simultaneous saving and borrowing
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be denoted Vsb (l). By construction,
Vsb (l) = [u (w − p+ l) + (1− ε)u (b−Rl) + (ε)u (b−Rl −Rxˆ (l))]
Let the optimal value of Vsb (l) be V¯sb.
V¯sb = max
l≥0
Vsb (l)
Since xˆ (l) is bounded above (Proposition 6), limε→0 Vsb (l) = u (w − p+ l) + u (b−Rl).
Therefore, if ε is suﬃciently low, V ∗ − V¯sb < Dmin.
Finally, given ε, assume F is large enough (re-apply the previous assumption on F ):
u (Rlmax)− u (0) < βεF
Under these conditions, agent 0 strictly prefers simultaneous saving and borrowing to pure
saving and pure borrowing.
The actual optimal point will not involve pinning agent 1 to the original optimal consumption.
Suppose agent 0 chose l = l∗ and the corresponding lˆ (x∗). The marginal utility benefit (to agent
1) and marginal utility cost (to agent 2) from raising l are, respectively:
u0 (w − p+ l∗)
(1− ε)Ru0 (b−Rl∗) + (ε)R
¡
1 + xˆ0 (l∗)
¢
u0 (b−Rl∗ −Rxˆ (l∗))
If xˆ did not vary with l, agent 0 would clearly like to reduce the loan size and transfer some
consumption to agent 2 (this follows from the definition of l∗). Whether she actually does so
depends on the magnitude of xˆ0 (l). If xˆ0 (l) has a large magnitude (i.e. it is costly to induce
investment — xˆ0 (l) is close to −1), then agent 0 will in fact choose to raise l. If xˆ0 (l) has a small
magnitude, agent 0 might lower l.
If agent 0 lowers l, she must raise x to maintain incentives for agent 1 to invest. This
lowers the wealth available in period 1, which results in a lowering of c and raising of agent
2’s consumption level. While this brings the marginal utilities of consumption between the two
periods closer to each other, it also lowers the total amount of wealth to be shared. Alternatively,
consider a rise in l and a drop in x. While this raises c and lowers agent 2’s consumption (thus
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pushing marginal utilities further apart), the change in c is greater than the change in agent 2’s
consumption. The relative strengths of this trade-oﬀ will determine the direction in which the
actual l will deviate from l∗.
It is also useful to note here that if, instead, the individual only had access to secure savings
(at a lower interest rate), then she would never choose to borrow and save simultaneously. In this
case, it is impossible for agent 0 to create a discontinuity in period 2 utility that gets exacerbated
if agent 1 over-consumes. To induce her future self to save, she will have to create incentives by
lowering the relative marginal cost of saving in period 1. Rather than use the costly device of
saving and borrowing, she will simply borrow to the point where agent 1 is willing to save. This
is because, in either case, agent 0 must appeal to the period 1 agent’s incentive to invest without
a new threat being created. To see this, consider any loan-savings combination that induces
investment. As shown in the proposition below, agent 0 can reduce both loan and savings in
such a way that total wealth rises (less money is burned), and the benefits accrue to agent 1.
If agent1 has money at her disposal, her incentive to invest remains intact. Thus, investment
continues to happen with less money wasted due to simultaneous saving and borrowing.
Proposition 5 Suppose the agent can borrow at interest rate r (R ≡ 1 + r) and can save at
interest rate t (T = 1 + t), where r > t. Then she will never save and borrow simultaneously.
The proof of this proposition is in the appendix.
4 Comparative Statics and Welfare
The propositions of the previous section suggest some natural comparative statics. I look at
variation in the four (potentially) observable exogenous variables — r, β, ε, F — and examine their
impact on the values associated with pure saving, pure borrowing, and simultaneous borrowing
and saving. To recap Proposition 4: (a) If r is suﬃciently low, then agent 0 prefers the optimal
investment outcome (V ∗) to the pure saving (no-investment) outcome (V¯s); (b) If β is suﬃciently
low, then agent 0 prefers V ∗ to the pure-loan (investment) outcome (V¯l); (c) If ε is suﬃciently
low (but above 0), then agent 0 prefers the simultaneous borrowing and saving (investment)
outcome (V¯sb) to V¯s and V¯l; (d) If F is suﬃciently high, then the assumption (in parts a, b, and
c) that the agent will always avoid the possibility of future default (if possible) indeed holds
true.
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We can think of F varying both at the level of the bank and at the level of the individual.
As F drops, agent 0’s ability to use simultaneous saving and borrowing as a threat initially
stays constant and then abruptly declines. Once F drops suﬃciently low, it is not even in agent
0’s interest to have a loan repaid. Hence, we expect that clients of banks with weaker default
penalties or individuals that are less susceptible to punishment will be less likely to engage in
simultaneous saving and borrowing.
It is common for microfinance institutions to assign clients to groups before issuing loans. If
internal savings takes place within such groups, the probability of savings not maturing, ε, is
likely to vary across groups. When ε = 0, simultaneous saving and borrowing cannot happen.
As ε rises, the initial eﬀect is ambiguous: the condition on F becomes easier to satisfy, thus
increasing the likelihood of simultaneous behavior; but the relative attractiveness of V¯l compared
to V¯sb rises. Ultimately, ε becomes too high to justify the utility cost of saving any money.
As β rises, V¯l rises and approaches V¯sb. However, this also makes it easier for the threat of
punishment to have bite. So, for low values of β, the eﬀect of a rise is ambiguous, but ultimately
the pure loan option dominates and simultaneous saving and borrowing disappears.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of changes in the interest rate. As we have seen, an increase in r
from very low levels leads to a rise in V¯s and a drop in V¯l and V¯sb. Also, this leads to a tightening
on the conditions for ε and β, with no change in the condition for F . Therefore, the likelihood
of simultaneous saving and borrowing declines in r.
The model also provides some interesting welfare implications that are directly linked to
the time inconsistent preferences of the agent. Following convention, we can think of welfare
as agent 0’s discounted lifetime utility. We can see that rises in ε and F , both of which are
associated with utility reductions for an exponential discounter, can raise the quasi-hyperbolic
agent’s utility. This is because a positive value of ε and a high value of F allow agent 0 to
construct a commitment device for agent 1. This is impossible to do if ε = 0 or F very low.
5 Conclusion
I have attempted to solve a puzzle of simultaneous borrowing and saving by providing a new
rationale for the phenomenon. When agents are sophisticated quasi-hyperbolic discounters,
access to a non-secure source of saving can be useful — by creating the threat of a large punishment
in the event of default, the agent can induce her future selves to invest. Actual utility loss in
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equilibrium is limited if the probability of default is low.
I have shown that, in this setting, simultaneous borrowing and saving cannot be optimal
if agents have time-consistent preferences. I have also shown that, if savings are secure, an
interest rate diﬀerential cannot explain this behavior. The agent is always better oﬀ when she
simply borrows to fund investment. Furthermore, when there is a small chance that savings will
disappear, the agent can find herself better oﬀ than if savings mature with certainty.
6 Appendix
A Additional Proofs
Statement of Proposition 1: When there is no investment to be made, the agent will never
borrow in period 0.
Proof. Suppose agent 0 saves any amount s and borrows l > 0. The period 1 wealth is w−s+ l.
Agent 1 will consume some 0 ≤ c∗ ≤ w − s− rl (since she will avoid default in the bad state in
period 2). From the period 0 perspective, lifetime utility is:
u (c∗) + (1− ε)u (w − c∗ + rs− rl) + εu (w − c∗ − s− rl) (7)
Now, consider the same s as above, but change the loan to lˆ = 0. The period 1 wealth is
now w − s. Consider the following consumption period 1: cˆ = c∗ + rl. This is an outcome
where the agent in 1 consumes what was previously interest on the loan, while leaving period 2
consumption unchanged. This gives us a lower bound on welfare from agent 0’s perspective (if
the agent in 1 deviates from this plan, it will be to transfer more consumption to period 2).
Agent 0’s discounted utility is bounded below by:
u (c+ rl) + (1− ε)u (w − c∗ + rs− rl) + εu (w − c∗ − s− rl) (8)
The utility in 8 is strictly higher than the utility in 7.
Statement of Proposition 5: Suppose the agent can borrow at interest rate r (R ≡ 1 + r)
and can save at interest rate t (T = 1 + t), where r > t. Then she will never save and borrow
simultaneously.
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Proof. Agent 0 will either plan for the investment to be made, or not. If the investment is not
made, clearly the optimal strategy is to save some amount s such that:
u0 (w − s) = u0 (Ts)
In this case, no loan will be taken.
If the agent 0 takes a loan, it must be to induce investment in period 1. Suppose the agent
borrows l > 0 and saves s > 0. It must be the case that the investment is made in period 1.
The utility from period 0 perspective (where s1 is the amount saved in period 1) is:
u (w − s+ l − s1) + u (b+ s1 − p+ Ts−Rl)
Now suppose we lower l and s such that ∆s = RT∆l. The period 1 incentive to save rises. Utility
from the period 0 perspective must go up.
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